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Abstract:
Purpose: To estimate the transition rates corresponding to the 2010 and 2012 elections to the
Catalan Parliament for the four constituencies in which Catalonia is divided for this purpose.
The main features of  the results, which are obtained by means of  mathematical programming,
are commented. 
Design/methodology/approach: Mathematical programming optimization models are
formulated in order to find the transition rates that yield a better adjust between the actual
results in 2012 and those computed applying the transition rates to the 2010 results. The
transition rate matrices are estimated for each one of  the four constituencies, since the set of
options is not the same for all them. No other assumptions that those of  numerical consistency
are adopted.
Findings and Originality/value: The transition rate models provide satisfactory goodness of
fit. Mathematical programming turns out to be an easy-to-use tool for estimating the transition
rates and, at the same time, very flexible, since, if  necessary, it allows incorporating the
constraints corresponding to additional assumptions.
Originality/value: The transition rates from 2010 to 2012 in Catalonia are particularly
interesting, since 2012 results implied a significant change in the composition of  the Catalan
Parliament. To the best of  our knowledge, no other scientific journal paper has dealt with this
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question. Our results are available to the researchers in order to interpret the change and try to
foresee future flows of  voters.
Keywords: voter transitions, electoral change, mathematical programming
1. Introduction
When considering the results of two consecutive elections in the same electoral area, a usual
way of trying to interpret the results of the later polls is seeing them as the consequence of
voter transitions from the options they preferred in the former. Politicians, the media, political
scientists and most citizens are interested in the changes of the preferences of people having
the right to vote.
According to Hawkes (1969) the historian Trevor Lloyd was the first of stating the question.
Before 1970, it was dealt with in some scarce works (Benewick, Birch, Blumler & Ewbank,
1969; Berrington, 1965; Butler, 1952, 1953; Butler & King, 1966;).
Formally, given the results of two consecutive (or even simultaneous) elections for each one of
the divisions (constituencies, municipalities, polling stations or any other partition) of an
electoral area, the problem is to find the matrix of transition rates from the options available in
the first election (rows) to the options in the second one (columns). Of course, if one considers
only aggregate results of the whole territory or of any set of constituencies, in general there
are infinitely many solutions to the matrix. On the other hand, applying a unique transition
rate matrix to diverse constituencies or groups of constituencies, the computed results will not
always coincide with the real ones. Clearly, the elements of the matrix must be nonnegative
and those belonging to any given file must sum up to 1 (these two conditions imply that the
elements must be less than or equal to 1).
A survey can be used to estimate the elements of the transition rate matrix. However, the
results are highly unreliable, because of many reasons that are discussed, for instance, in
Brown and Payne (1986) and in Van der Ploeg, Van de Pol and Kampen (2006). Moreover,
unless the number of elements in the sample is very high, many elements of the matrix (those
corresponding to small values of the transition rate) will be equal to zero. Therefore, at the
expense of greater modelling and computing efforts, the use of the results of both elections is
a more reliable way to obtain the matrix.
Hawkes (1969) tried “to estimate the number of people voting for a particular party at one
election who subsequently vote for another specified party at the next election”. In order to do
this, proposed three methods. However, these did not guarantee that the results fulfil the
stated above conditions. Therefore, the author concluded that although “the attempt has not
been as successful as one would wish, some useful results are obtainable”. Miller (1972) and
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Upton (1977) adopt an approach that may be inscribed in the same stream that Hawkes
(1969). Other related works are Hayes (1976) and Moores (1987).
Instead, Irwin and Meeter (1969) and McCarthy and Ryan (1977) use quadratic programming
to estimate the transition rates, thus guaranteeing from the outside the fulfilling of the above
mentioned conditions, which are imposed by means of constraints in the mathematical
programming. Tziafetas (1986) uses an approach similar to that of McCarthy and Ryan (1977)
and a variant of it, which consists in using the absolute value of the deviations instead of the
squares of them.
Upton (1978), concerning McCarthy and Ryan’s approach, observes that it gives a high
proportion of zeroes in the matrix and concludes that overestimates the proportion of stayers
(voters that do not change their preferences between the to elections –actually, electors that
vote for options whose name is the same in both elections−, contrasting with movers). This
criticism, which we do not deem fully justified, has been assumed by other authors, as, for
instance Johnston and Hay (1983).
The estimation of voters’ transition rates is often seen as a particular case of the ecological
inference problem, i. e., to deduct individual behaviours from aggregate data, a problem which
was deemed impossible, with the methods available at that time, in Robinson (1950). This
notwithstanding, many methods have been proposed for dealing with it. Some of them
assume, perhaps implicitly, that the behaviour pattern is the same or very similar in all the
areas (ecological regressions; see: Goodman, 1953; Goodman, 1959; concerning transition
rates: Fülle, 1994; van der Ploeg et al., 2006). Others, consider that the behaviour pattern
may depend on the areas and usually adopt a probabilistic approach (ecological inference; see:
Glynn & Wakefield, 2010; Greiner & Quinn, 2009; Grofman & Merrill, 2004; King, 1997;
concerning transition rates –probabilities−: Andreadis & Chadjipadelis, 2009; Antweiler, 2007;
Brown & Payne, 1986; Johnston & Hay, 1983).
The purpose of the present paper is to determine, for the 2010 and 2012 elections to the
Parliament of Catalonia, a transition matrix for each constituency that (i) fulfils the
nonnegative and sum-to-one constraints; (ii) applied to the aggregate results of the first
election give exactly the results of the second one for each one of the available options in this
later and (iii) minimises a function of the discrepancies between the results obtained with the
matrix and those given by the count of votes in every division. Note that we neither formulate
any assumption about the differences or coincidences between the behaviour patterns of the
electors corresponding to diverse polling stations nor adopt a probabilistic point of view. 
Therefore, the problem can be stated as a mathematical programming model, which for some
kinds of discrepancy functions is easy to solve. Even though our purpose is to find transition
matrices for any set of divisions (and for different kinds of divisions), without introducing any a
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priori assumption about the values of the transition rates, we will comment some results given
by the models in order to facilitate their interpretation. 
The layout of the rest of the article is as follows. Section 2 presents the problem and its
mathematical programming formulations. The data and the obtained results are presented and
commented in Section 3. Section 4 ends the paper with some short conclusions. 
2. Statement of the Problem and its Mathematical Programming Formulation
It is assumed that we have the results corresponding to two elections in the same electoral
area, such that the first one happened at t and the second one at t’(≥t). 
When t’ is very close to t (or even equal to t) it may be that the censuses corresponding to
both elections are identical. If actually they are not, however, it is usual to circumvent this
difficulty assuming that the behaviour of the electors not belonging to the intersection of both
censuses is not different from those that belong to it. In fact, this is equivalent to assume that
both censuses are identical and this assumption is reasonable when t’ is not far from t (Brown
& Payne, 1986; Hawkes, 1969; McCarthy & Ryan, 1977), as happen with the two elections
considered in this paper, separated by only two years (2010, 2012).
The electoral area is partitioned into constituencies and these, at the end, into polling stations.
Therefore the results are available for all the polling stations of the electoral area. It may
happen that the polling stations belonging to a given constituency do not coincide from one
election to another (because some are created, suppressed or divided) and in this case one
can only compare the results corresponding to the polling stations common to both elections.
On another hand, the available options (including blank vote, null vote and abstention) may be
different from one constituency to another (in the case of the elections for the Catalan
Parliament, they are, since the candidates to win the seats are different, even for the options
with the same name). Therefore, the constituencies have to be considered separately. 
Hence, the data must refer always to a given constituency or a subset of polling stations
belonging to a given constituency. The considered polling units can be grouped to form
divisions (therefore, a division is a set of one ore more polling stations; every considered
polling station must belong to one and only one division). The divisions may be, for instance,
municipalities, districts or any sets of polling units that be convenient for the analysis.
-125-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1189
The notation that we use for the data are as follows:
m Number of divisions (common to both elections).
n, n’ Number of options at t and t’, respectively.
pik Proportion of votes obtained at t by the option k in the division i (i = 1, …, m; k = 1, …, n).
pij Proportion of votes obtained at t’ by the option j in the division i (i = 1, …, m; j = 1, …, n’).
ci Census (i.e., number of people having the right to vote) of division i at t’, assumed to be
equal to that of t (i = 1, …, m).
And for the decision variables:
rkj Transition rate from option k at t to option j at t’ (k = 1, …, n; j = 1, …, n’).
The matrix R made up of the transition rates rkj must belong to the set F defined by the
following constraints:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Equation 1 impose that the transition rates from an option at t to every other at t’ must sum
up to one; Equation 2, that the total number of votes obtained in the constituency by an option
at t’ equals the number that results when applying the transition rates to the number of votes
corresponding to t (under the assumption that the census at t and at t’ are the same);
Equation 3 enforce the obvious non-negativity condition.
The mathematical programming models proposed in McCarthy and Ryan (1977) and Tziafetas
(1986) include constraints (1) and (3). Constraints (2) are similar to those proposed in
Johnston and Hay (1983).
These constraints define a set of matrices having generally infinitely many elements. One way
to select one of these elements is to minimise the discrepancies between the actual results of
elections at t’ and those resulting from the application of the transition rates. Of course, the
selected matrix depends on the used measure of the discrepancies. 
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This way we define the following four models:
The objective functions of the models are (M1) the sum of the squared discrepancies between
actual and modelled number of votes, (M2) the sum of the squared discrepancies between
actual and modelled proportions, (M3) the value of the maximum discrepancy between actual
and modelled number of votes and (M4) the value of the maximum discrepancy between
actual and modelled proportions.
Since the constraints that define the set F are linear, M1 and M2 are quadratic programs. For
their part, M3 and M4 can be reformulated as linear programs as follows:
As it is known, however, minmax problems have usually multiple optimums, since the objective
function does not take into account the values of the discrepancies that are strictly less than
the optimum value. Therefore, after solving M3 and M4, more satisfactory solutions may be
obtained using a second criterion (the sum of the absolute values of all the discrepancies); this
leads to the following two quadratic programming models:
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Where * and * are, respectively, the optimum values of the objective function corresponding
to M3 and M4.
3. Data and results
The data sets used in the computational experiment correspond to the elections to the
Parliament of Catalonia held on 28 November 2010 and 25 November 2012.
The constituencies coincide with the four provinces of Catalonia: Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and
Tarragona.
Each province is divided into comarques, and, for its part, each comarca is divided into
municipalities. Catalonia has 41 comarques and 947 municipalities.
The municipalities, for electoral purposes, are divided into sections, so that in each section the
number of registered electors belongs to the interval 500-2,000 (with the possible exception of
small relatively isolated villages, in which the number of registered electors may be less than
500). According to this, because of the changes in population, from one election to the next a
section can be divided into two or more or can be incorporated to another. Of course, the data
used in the computational experiment are only those corresponding to sections that remain
unchanged.
The values of m, n and n’ corresponding to the four constituencies in the used data set are
included in Table 1.
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Constituency Number of divisions (m) Number of options in 2010 (n) Number of options in 2010 (n’)
Barcelona  3573 32 19
Girona    523 29 19
Lleida    390 32 19
Tarragona    523 33 19
Table 1. Sizes of the data sets used in the computational experiment. In all cases, the number of options
includes null and blank votes and abstention
To solve the six mathematical programming models described in the preceding section for each
one of the constituencies the software CPLEX 12.2 was used. The computing times were not
significant in any case. The transition matrices obtained with models M3 and M4 can be
disregarded, since those corresponding to models M3’ and M4’, respectively, are always
preferable; only the optimum values of their respective objective functions are used (as inputs
for models M3’ and M4’, respectively).
In order to evaluate the goodness of fit of the solutions provided for the different models we
will use the following criteria, respectively related to the objective functions of models M1, M2,
M3’ and M4’:
• , coefficient of determination corresponding to the numbers of votes, defined as
follows:
where  
(i.e., the proportion of votes obtained globally by the option j in the set of divisions).
• , coefficient of determination corresponding to the proportions:
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• max, the maximum discrepancy between actual and modelled numbers of votes.
• max, the maximum discrepancy between actual and modelled proportions of votes.
Coefficients of determination, which are useful as complementary information to assess the
goodness of fit of the models, may be defined for each option as well:
Of course, models M1 and M2 will yield always the best values of  and , respectively
(since the denominators in the definition of these criteria are constants and the respective
numerators are the objective functions of M1 and M2). In a similar way, models M3-M3’ and
M4-M4’ will be the best for max and max, respectively. The behaviour of the mentioned models
with regard to the other criteria is difficult to forecast, excepting that M1 and M2 are more
robust than M3’ and M4’ in relation to outliers.
The transition rates matrices and the values of all the criteria described above for Barcelona,
Girona, Lleida and Tarragona, can be found in:
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/6741065/RESULTS%20BARCELONA.xlsx,
 https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/6741065/RESULTS%20GIRONA.xlsx,
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/6741065/RESULTS%20LLEIDA.xlsx and
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/6741065/RESULTS%20TARRAGONA.xlsx, respectively.
Table 2 shows the values of the four criteria corresponding to the four models M1, M2, M3’ and
M4’ and to the four constituencies.
One can see that the values of  and  are good (high). The latter, with M2, reaches 0.97 for
Tarragona, while the best value of  is 0.86 (Barcelona and Girona). Concerning these two
criteria, the results are very similar for both M1 and M2, although, of course, M1 gets the best
values for  and M2 for . The worst value, from those given by M1, of  is 0.77
(Tarragona) and the worst of , from those given by M2, is 0.75 (Lleida). 
For their side, the values of max and max are high, even for M3’ and M4’ and, although they are
not very much better than those obtained with M1 and M2, when the objective of minimising
these criteria is imposed (M3’ and M4’) the values of  and  deteriorate.
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max max
M1 BAR 0.86
GIR 0.86
LLE 0.81
TAR 0.77
BAR 0.85
GIR 0.83
LLE 0.74
TAR 0.97
BAR 289.01
GIR 123.60
LLE 139.52
TAR 175.80
BAR 0.30
GIR 0.19
LLE 0.18
TAR 0.27
M2 BAR 0.86
GIR 0.85
LLE 0.80
TAR 0.76
BAR 0.85
GIR 0.83
LLE 0.75
TAR 0.97
BAR 289.50
GIR 129.16
LLE 153.24
TAR 177.38
BAR 0.30
GIR 0.18
LLE 0.19
TAR 0.26
M3’ BAR 0.83
GIR 0.85
LLE 0.80
TAR 0.74
BAR 0.83
GIR 0.82
LLE 0.73
TAR 0.97
BAR 220.79
GIR 112.06
LLE 119.60
TAR 151.23
BAR 0.30
GIR 0.19
LLE 0.18
TAR 0.27
M4’ BAR 0.82
GIR 0.84
LLE 0.70
TAR 0.63
BAR 0.82
GIR 0.82
LLE 0.65
TAR 0.96
BAR 363.75
GIR  140.13
LLE 181.51
TAR 223.96
BAR 0.28
GIR 0.15
LLE 0.14
TAR 0.23
Table 2. Values of the four criteria corresponding to the four models and
the four constituencies: Barcelona (BAR), Girona (GIR), Lleida (LLE)
and Tarragona (TAR). The best values of the criteria, for each
constituency, are highlighted in bold. Of course, they are, for , , max
and max those obtained, respectively, with models M1, M2, M3’ and M4’.
Since the 16 transition rate matrices obtained for the four constituencies with the four models,
even though they show some common characteristics, are fairly different, it is not possible to
analyse them here in detail and we will limit ourselves to some general comments and to
deepen a little more into the transition rate matrix given by M1 for the constituency of
Barcelona.
In 2010, seven options won seats in the Catalan Parliament. In 2012, there were again seven
the options present in the Parliament, but different from those of 2010, because SI (4 seats in
2010) did not obtain representation in 2012 and CUP, which did not present lists of candidates
in 2010, won 3 seats in 2012. Table 3 shows, for the options that won seats, either in 2010 or
in 2012, and for the abstention, the results they obtained, for the overall of the four
constituencies, in both elections. For its side, Table 4 shows analogous data for the
constituency of Barcelona.
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OPTION % 2010 Seats 2010 % 2012 Seats 2012 % 2012 - % 2010 Seats 2012 – seats 2010
CiU 22.91 62 21.16 50 -1.75 -12
PSC-PSOE 10.91 28 9.96 20 -0.95 -8
PP 7.35 18 8.95 19 1.60 1
ICV-EUiA 4.39 10 6.83 13 2.44 3
ERC 4.17 10 9.44 21 5.27 11
C’s 2.02 3 5.22 9 3.20 6
SI 1.97 4 0.89 0 -1.08 -4
CUP - - 2.40 3 2.40 3
Other 4.05 - 3.10 - -0.95 -
Blank 1.75 - 1.01 - -0.74 -
Null 0.43 - 0.61 - 0.18 -
Abstention 40.05 - 30.43 - -9.62 -
Note that the percentages are over the census (not, as it is more usual, over the valid votes for the lists of candidates)
Table 3. Main global results of the elections to the Catalan Parliament held in 2010 and 2012
OPTION % 2010 Seats 2010 % 2012 Seats 2012 % 2012 - % 2010 Seats 2012 – seats 2010
CiU 22.00 35 19.45 26 -2.55 -9
PSC-PSOE 11.42 18 10.68 14 -0.74 -4
PP 7.67 12 9.21 12 1.54 0
ICV-EUiA 4.94 8 7.73 10 2.79 2
ERC 3.80 6 8.81 12 5.01 6
C’s 2.30 3 5.85 8 3.55 5
SI 1.86 3 0.82 0 -1.04 -3
CUP - - 2.36 3 2.36 3
Other 3.94 - 3.44 - -0.50 -
Blank 1.74 - 0.97 - -0.77 -
Null 0.38 - 0.57 - 0.19 -
Abstention 39.95 - 30.11 - -9.84 -
Note that the percentages are over the census (not, as it is more usual, over the valid votes for the lists of candidates)
Table 4. Main results, in the constituency of Barcelona, of the elections to the Catalan Parliament held in
2010 and 2012
In all constituencies, according to the solutions of the models, there is a positive flow from CiU
to ERC, which, in Girona, Lleida and Tarragona is the balance that results from a bidirectional
flow (from CiU to ERC and from ERC to CiU). Also in all constituencies PSC-PSOE losses votes
in favour of a certain number of options (mainly, ICV-EUiA, C’s and PP). A certain number of PP
voters in 2010 changed to to C’s in 2012. With the exception of Barcelona, ICV-EUIA shows a
low proportion of stayers and the movers go to CUP and ERC. C’s enjoys high proportions of
stayers and gets votes from PSC-PSOE and PP. SI has no stayers in any constituency and its
movers go mainly to CiU and to ERC as well; in Barcelona it receives a small proportion of the
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votes got by CiU in 2010. The votes for CUP come mainly from ICV-EUiA and numerous minor
options that won seat neither in 2010 nor in 2012; in Barcelona, moreover, CUP receives a
significant amount of votes from CiU. 
The Barcelona constituency stands out for the high proportion of stayers that have the
abstention and the options that won seats both in 2010 and 2012 (from M1: CiU, 77%; PSC-
PSOE, 82%; PP, 91%; ICV-EUiA, 94%; ERC, 100%; C’s, 100%; abstention, 75%). Figure 1
shows the main flows, from 2010 to 2012, given by M1 in this constituency.
Figure 1. Main flows from 2010 to 2012, given by M1 for the constituency of Barcelona,
for the elections to the Catalan Parliament. The numbers next to the arrows are,
expressed as a percentage, the corresponding transition rates (those under 1% are
omitted). All the options represented in the figure, including abstention and with the
exception of CiU, also receive flows from a certain number of minor options
4. Conclusions
This paper describes the problem of computing the transition rates corresponding to two
consecutive elections held in the same electoral area. Four mathematical programming models
are proposed to deal with it and are applied, regarding the 2010 and 2012 elections to the
Catalan Parliament, to the four constituencies in which Catalonia is divided for this purpose.
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The models include constraints to guarantee that the total number of votes obtained in the
constituency by an option at t’ equals the number that results when applying the transition
rates to the number of votes corresponding to t. The main features of the obtained results are
commented. Mathematical programming reveals itself as a powerful flexible tool to calculate
transition rates matrices.
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